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Abstract  Services providers, such as public healthcare systems and government agencies, are under tremendous 
pressure to reduce costs and improve service quality. Scheduling is an important managerial component which has 
considerable impact on both the costs and quality of services. Service providers need customers’ availability 
information to improve resource utilization. On the other hand, customers may be of “two minds” about 
communicating their private information. While communicating certain amount of availability might be necessary in 
order to obtain preferred schedules, too much communication place a potential cost due to privacy loss. In this 
paper, we present a bidding-based mechanism which aims at generating high quality schedules and, at the same 
time, protecting customers’ privacy. We show that, under the proposed bidding procedure, myopic bidding is the 
dominant strategy for customers. We also evaluate the privacy and efficiency performance of the proposed 
mechanism through a computational study.  
 
Keyword: Non-commercial services, distributed scheduling, privacy, efficiency, iterative bidding, 
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1. Introduction 
With increasing levels of globalization, organizations no longer compete directly, but rather 
compete based on their respective supply chains. The competitiveness of supply chains largely 
depends on effective information-sharing among supply chain partners. Having accurate 
information about inventory levels, orders, production, and delivery status provides a tremendous 
opportunity to improve the way the supply chain is designed and managed. However, 
information-sharing in a supply chain has proved difficult to implement [1]. The barriers are 
significant due to a lack of trust between trading partners. Companies fear that information 
voluntarily shared will be used against them or will leak to a competitor. Huge potential benefits 
of supply chain collaborations go unrealized due to a reluctance to share private information. 





Various approaches have been proposed to enable supply chain information-sharing under the 
constraint that trading partners have the desire to protect their privacy. One stream of them 
focuses on the design of incentive mechanisms. As the most successful application of mechanism 
design, auction theory has been used to facilitate supply chain collaboration in distributed 
settings [2][3][4]. To optimize the supply chain, auction mechanisms typically provide incentives 
which motivate trading partners to reveal their private information truthfully. In addition to 
auctions, cooperative game theory has also find applications in supply chain collaboration [5]. 
Another line of research looks at the problem from cryptographic perspective. Typically, secure 
multiparty computation techniques [6] are applied in supply chain collaboration settings [7][8]. 
There is also an emerging trend in developing intellectual property protection mechanisms 
against information leakage and reverse engineering in supply chain collaboration [9]. While 
most of the existing supply chain collaboration approaches have been developed for 
manufacturing sector, in this paper, we focus our attention on services supply chain. In 
particular, we study the privacy and efficiency issues arising in services collaboration.  
Unlike more traditional manufacturing supply chains, service capacity in a supply chain is 
usually time dependent and typically cannot be held in inventory. For example, if a certain 
amount of seats on a flight are not booked, the transportation capacity of those seats on this 
particular flight will be wasted and cannot be stored in inventory for future usage. Without 
inventory as a buffer, matching capacity with demand is frequently more challenging in service 
supply chains [10]. In many business services, such as airline tickets booking, hotel room 
reservation, and vacation package booking, companies encourage potential customers to get a 
service time and price “quote” prior to ordering. By quoting different prices on service times, 
service providers can balance the demands throughout a week, a month, or seasons of a year, 
therefore, optimize their resource utilization. However, in non-commercial services industries, 
such as scientific facility services, government services and healthcare services, for social 
economic and political reasons, service providers cannot use dynamic pricing strategies to 
balance the demands along the service timelines. In this paper, we study the scheduling aspect of 
non-commercial service supply chain management. In particular, we are interested in knowing 
how to design effective mechanisms for services scheduling and how privacy and efficiency 
interplay under such mechanisms. We design an auction-based (iterative bidding, in particular) 




price mechanisms to balance the demand and (2) customers are reluctant to share their complete 
availability information due to privacy concerns. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 introduces the non-commercial services scheduling problem and its privacy 
implication. Section 3 formulates the service provider’s and customers’ decision problems. 
Section 4 presents a bidding-based scheduling framework and provides theoretical analysis on its 
properties. Section 5 evaluates the privacy and efficiency performance of the proposed 
scheduling framework. Section 6 concludes the paper and discusses future improvements. 
2. Non-Commercial Services Scheduling and its Privacy Implication 
The non-commercial service scheduling (NCSS) problem concerns the allocation of limited 
resources to the service activities at specific times. This allocation must obey a set of rules or 
constraints that reflect the temporal relationships between activities and the capacity limitations 
of a set of shared service resources. To motivate the research from a practical perspective, in this 
section, we first describe an example application domain where the proposed approach is needed. 
We then discuss the privacy implication of NCSS. 
2.1. Synchrotron Facility Scheduling 
Canadian Light Sources (CLS: http://www.lightsource.ca/), is a national science research 
laboratory for the production of high intensity synchrotron light from the infrared, visible, and 
ultraviolet to x-ray region of the electromagnetic spectrum and is accessible to scientists and 
researchers from the academic, government and private sectors. Currently, the CLS has about 
3,000 researchers in Canada and other parts of the world as its user community. The CLS has 
two calls for proposals each year resulting in a scheduling cycle of 6 months. Proposals are 
evaluated by a scientific committee composed of researchers from universities and industries 
across the country. Each application is assigned a weight based on its potential contribution to 
the advancement of knowledge and impact on the scientific community. The proposals that are 
approved by the peer review procedure need to be scheduled in the next scheduling cycle. CLS 
needs to improve the utilization of expensive synchrotron resources and, at the same time, 
maximize the overall scientific contributions of the experiments. CLS knows the weight 
(scientific contribution) of each application. However, they do not have direct access to 
customers’ availability information, which is privately held by customers. To compute a 




CLS first schedule facility development and maintenance shifts which are not available for 
customers’ experiments. After the shifts open to customers are determined, CLS will contact the 
researchers and allocate the open shifts to their experiments.  The scheduling of experiment 
shifts is a multilateral negotiation process mainly done through phone calls and emails. 
2.2. Privacy vs. Efficiency 
NCSS can be modeled as an optimization problem in which private availability information of 
customers constraints the solution space. If all customers report their full availability, the service 
provider can obtain an optimal schedule by solving the optimization problem. However, if, for 
privacy reasons, the customers only reveal partial availability to the service provider, the quality 
of the solution will be compromised.  
The lack of complete availability information can be a major constraint that limits the quality 
of the schedules. High quality schedules maybe determined infeasible given the partial 
availability information from customers. The scheduling problem facing the service providers is 
a decentralized scheduling problem [11] in the sense that the true availability of the customers is 
their private information and may not be known to the service provider. Customers are reluctant 
to reveal their complete availability because a complete revelation exposes too much privacy and 
increases the possibility of being assigned an undesirable time slot. Consider, for example, the 
synchrotron facility scheduling environment mentioned previously. Bob needs to conduct his 
experiment in the facility. He can be available any time from January to August. However, he 
prefers the experiment to be scheduled as earlier as possible because there is a possibility that he 
may go vacation sometime during the summer. Based on his previous experience and his 
knowledge of the profile of current year’s applications, he believes that experiments with similar 
weight of his are likely to be offered a service time slot two months after the originally requested 
dates. Therefore, statistically, if he reports January to April as his available time window, he will 
have much higher chance ending up in June or even sometime earlier. After his calculation, Bob 
may report January to April which is not his complete availability.  
Generating high quality schedules and, at the same time, accommodating customers’ 
preference and privacy concerns is challenging. In addition to dealing with strategic behaviors 
from customers, the administrative workload of collecting customers’ availability information 




customers and a manually managed process.  The proposed approach provides the possibility of 
automating the NCSS procedure and improving the quality of schedules. In the next section, we 
formulate the service provider’s and customers’ decision problems in NCSS.  
3. Formulation of Service provider’s and Customers’ Decision Problems 
Services scheduling is multilateral decision making with the service provider and customers 
as independent decision makers. The service provider needs to decide how to schedule service 
requests to achieve its objectives and, at the same time, respect the customer’s availability 
constraints. The decision facing a customer is how much availability information she needs to 
reveal in order to maximize her benefit. In this section, we formulate the decision problems 
facing the service provider and customers.  
3.1. Service Provider’s Decision Problem 
Consider a NCSS problem consists of a service provider and a group of customers. The 
provider receives a set of   service requests from customers. Each request is assigned a weight 
which reflects its contribution to the provider’s objective. The provider has limited service 
capacity and knows the time required for processing a request. The provider’s objective is to 
maximize the sum of the weights of a schedule. An important type of constraints of NCSS is the 
customers’ availability. Since customers need to be present for the service, the provider cannot 
schedule a customer to a time slot during which she is not available. We describe a customer’s 
availability by a set of available time intervals along the scheduling timeline.   As we will later 
develop an iterative bidding framework for NCSS, we represent an available time interval as a 
bid from a customer using the bundle bidding language [12] developed for combinatorial 
auctions.  To apply the language, we need to first discretize the provider’s service timeline into 
fixed-size time units.  In this way, without loss of generality, an available time interval can be 
defined by a bundle of adjacent time units contained in the interval. Different from the general 
combinatorial auctions, customers do not attach prices to their bids in NCSS. In our case, bids 
are used by the customers to indicate their availabilities. If a customer submit a bid (available 
time interval), she informs the provider that she is available to be scheduled during that interval. 
The set of intervals that contains a customer’s complete availability is referred to as the 




Let    be the set of availability intervals revealed by customer  . It is clear that    is a subset of 
customer  ’s FTI.  The service provider will not schedule customer  ’s request outside her   . Let 
   be the weight scale of customer   assigned by the service provider and    the processing time 
of customer  ’s request. Let   be the set of time units available for allocation and   be the set of 
customers who have service requests to be scheduled; let   ( )    
if the time unit bundle 
    is allocated to customer    and zero otherwise. The provider’s decision problem is to 
determine the allocation of limited service time to the requests in a way that the sum of the 
weights of the awarded requests is maximized. The problem can be formulated as the following 
integer programming. 
   ∑ ∑   ( )             
subject to 
∑   ( )                            (1) 
∑ ∑   ( )           
 
                  (2) 
∑   ( )  ∑   ( )                            (3) 
| |     ( )                           (4) 
| |          ( )                     (5) 
  ( )  {   }                         (6) 
The set of constraints (1) ensures that any customer can only obtain one bundle of time units. 
The set of constraints (2) ensures that a time unit is not included into two bundles which have 
been assigned to the customers. The set of constraints (3) ensure that if a bundle is assigned to a 
customer, it must belong to the set of available intervals submitted by the customer. These 
constraints prevent service provider from assigning customers time bundles which they are not 
willing to accept. Constraints (4) (5) ensure that if a bundle is assigned to a customer, the length 
of the bundle is equal to the processing time of the customer’s request, where   is a large 
positive constant, which is used for the linearization of the logical constraint “if.” The minimum 
value of   depends on the problem instance. In general, a   that is greater than the number of 
available time units of the service provider is large enough to enforce the logical “if” constraint. 
Constraints (6) are integer constraints. The provider’s decision problem is NP-hard as stated in 





Theorem 1 The service provider’s decision problem in NCSS is NP-hard. 
Proof: Consider a special case of the provider’s decision problem, in which a set of   service 
requests from customers need to be scheduled. A request may be scheduled on one of the   
intervals on a discrete time scale on a single resource.  The decision version of this special case 
of provider’s decision problem is identical to the job interval selection problem, which is NP-
complete [13]. Therefore, the decision version of provider’s decision problem is NP-complete. It 
follows that provider’s decision problem is NP-hard . 
3.2. Customers’ Decision Problem 
To model customers’ decision problem, we first introduce their preference structure over the 
time intervals in their FTIs. A customer’s FTI is her private information not known to the service 
provider. She may behave strategically, for example hide part of her FTI, to maximize her 
benefits. To reflect this self-interest property of the customers, we call them agents
1
. We assume 
that an agent prefers some time intervals over others within its FTI and the preferences can be 
quantified by associating a preference violation cost to each time interval. Preference violation 
cost reflects the level of the preference violations to the agent. It is essentially a subjective 
measure adopted by an agent. For example, it can be a function of the number and severity of 
preference violations that a time interval may cause to the agent. In many cases, it is reasonable 
to assume that an agent can order the time intervals in its FTI according to the increasing order of 
their preference violation costs. That is, given an ordered FTI,                
 |   |     is known to the agent, where    denotes the preference violation cost of the  th time 
interval in FTI and    denotes the preference violation cost of not being allocated any time 
intervals (for the sake of simplicity, we drop the agent subscript in this subsection). Note that an 
agent may have identical preference violation costs for more than one time intervals. In a FTI, 
the highest preference violation cost is that of not being awarded in the service schedule. 
Anything beyond that is not included since it is not relevant to our NCSS.   
An agent would prefer to be assigned a time interval with lowest preference violation cost. 
However, the final schedule is computed based on the submitted time intervals from all agents. 
Because of the potential time conflicts among agents’ requests, it is difficult for them to decide 
how much availability information it should reveal in order to obtain a preferred assignment. If 
                                                          
1 In this paper agents also refer to the trading software entities that represent the customer. From this point forward, when we mention 




an agent only submits a few low cost time intervals, it can control the upper bound of its 
preference violation cost as the awarded bundle must be within the set of submitted intervals. 
However, by doing so, it runs the risk of not being allocated anything if the submitted time 
intervals are also demanded by other agents with higher weights.  On the other hand, if an agent 
submits its complete FTI, it maximizes its probability of getting an assignment. However, 
reporting complete FTI increases the possibility of ending up with an interval with high 
preference violation cost. In fact, there is not a clear strategy for agents to minimize their 
expected preference violation costs.  The effectiveness of an agent’s bidding strategy depends on 
how heavy the competition is for its desired time intervals and other agents’ bidding strategies. 
This uncertainty leads to speculation during bidding, which will increase agents’ computation 
cost and may render final schedule arbitrarily far from optimal. Our goal, therefore, is to design a 
mechanism which systematically evolves the solution towards an optimal one given the 
constraint that agents try to avoid high cost assignments by not revealing their complete 
availability. Since no payment is allowed in the NCSS setting, the possibility of applying 
standard one-shot VCG mechanisms [14][15][16] and even its iterative implementations [17] is 
eliminated. In the following section, we will propose a non-price bidding approach to the NCSS 
problem. We will also evaluate the performance of the approach in Section V.  
4. The Iterative Bidding Framework 
The bidding framework proposed in this paper is an iterative bundle auction. It contains two 
major components: an iterative bidding procedure and an integer programming model for winner 
determination. The winner determination model computes provisional schedules which 
maximize the sum of the weights of winning bids at each round. The iterative bidding procedure 
provides a structure for the agents and the service provider (auctioneer) to interact in a 
systematic way and eventually evolve the provisional solutions towards an optimal one. Iterative 
bidding also reduces agents’ information revelation and adds the potential of accommodating 
dynamic changes during the bidding process.  The iterative bidding framework is a single-
attribute auction, which allows negotiation over a non-price attribute: the level of availability of 
agents revealed to the auctioneer. The framework has good privacy preserving properties. It 






Figure 1.   Flow chart of the iterative bidding procedure for NCSS problems 
4.1. Iterative Bidding 
The iterative bidding procedure is depicted as a flow chart in Figure 1.  The bidding procedure 
consists of four components, namely initialization, availability update and bidding, termination 
checking and winner determination. The auctioneer first publishes its open time units to agents 
and subsequently invites agents to submit their preferred time intervals. The iterative bidding is a 
collaborative interaction procedure between the auctioneer and the agents.  
4.1.1. Initialization 
Initially, an agent has a service request and knows its FTI. The agent constructs its initial bid 
by selecting the available time intervals with lowest preference violation cost and sends them to 
the auctioneer. If a bid contains more than one time intervals, they are connected by XOR logical 
connector meaning that the agent is willing to be scheduled in either of the intervals and the 
agent is indifferent from the intervals in terms of the preference violation cost.  
4.1.2. Availability Update and Bidding  
After the provisional schedule which resulted from the winner determination at round     is 
presented to the agents, at the beginning of round   (   ), an agent needs to decide whether it 




provisional schedule at round    , it has two availability update options at round  : (1) it can 
submit additional time intervals; (2) it can also keep the set of submitted time intervals 
unchanged by submitting an empty bid (a bid does not contain any time intervals). However, if 
an agent does so, the auctioneer will consider the agent has entered into the final bid status and 
the agent is forbidden from updating its availability in future rounds. On the other hand, if an 
agent won in the last round, it also has the option of submitting additional time intervals or 
submitting an empty bid. However, in this winning case, the agent does not enter into the final 
bid status.  
 
Figure 2.        Agents’ myopic bidding strategy at a specific round 
Although the auction rule allows an agent to bid differently in both the losing and winning 
cases, we will show in the next section that, since agents are assumed to be rational in 
minimizing their preference violation costs, they will always follow the myopic bidding strategy 
which is described in Figure 2. The myopic bidding strategy says if an agent won during the last 
round, it will submit an empty bid at the current round; if the agent lost, it will check whether all 
the intervals in its FTI have been submitted. If yes, the agent will still submit an empty bid 
because there are no more available time intervals to be added; if no, the agent will select the 





4.2. Bids Screening and Termination Checking 
Once bids are received from the agents, the auctioneer first screens out invalid ones. Those 
bids will not be considered in the following winner determination procedure. Invalid bids are 
defined as containing (1) time intervals which have been submitted in the previous rounds; (2) 
new time intervals from agents who have already declared their final bidding status in previous 
rounds; and (3) a time interval which is shorter than the processing time of the agent’s request. 
The auctioneer then checks the termination condition against the valid bids. The auction 
terminates if there is no new availability added. That is, each agent that bid in the last round has 
either submitted an empty bid or withdrawn from the bidding process. After the auction 
terminates, the auctioneer implements the final schedule.  If the termination condition is not 
satisfied, the auctioneer will update agents’ availability information by adding the newly 
submitted time intervals to those already submitted in previous rounds and solve the winner 
determination model using the updated availability information as input.  
4.3. Winner Determination 
The auctioneer needs to compute a new provisional schedule in each round as long as the 
auction is not terminated. At round  , the new provisional schedule    solves provider’s decision 
problem model with updated availability from all bidding agents.  It is possible that there exist 
multiple schedules with the same optimal overall weight.  Which optimal schedule the auctioneer 
will find is determined by a combination of many factors, such as the design and configuration of 
the winner determination algorithm and the organization pattern of the input data. After winner 
determination, the auctioneer will inform all bidding agents with the results regarding whether 
they win or lose at round  . After receiving the results, the agents will decide their strategy on 
availability updating and start a new round of bidding. It is important to note that the winner 
determination model here is different from that of many other combinatorial auctions, in which 
the losing bids will not be considered in future rounds [18]. In our model, the bid from an agent 
is just a new addition to its already submitted availability. When computing the provisional 
schedule, winner determination algorithm will consider all time intervals submitted from an 
agent during current and previous rounds. In addition, the provisional schedule is determined by 





4.4. Properties of the Iterative Bidding Framework 
In the design of the iterative bidding framework, we have assumed that agents bid according to 
the myopic bidding strategy described in Figure 2. As agents are self-interested, a question arises 
naturally: will the agents really follow the myopic strategy? We now study the iterative bidding 
framework from incentive compatibility perspective. We prove that the myopic bidding strategy 
we have assumed is the dominant strategy for agents as stated in the following proposition. 
Proposition 1 Given the proposed iterative bidding mechanism, myopic bidding is the 
dominant strategy for agents.  
Proof: It’s clear that if an agent has already been awarded in the previous round, there is no 
reason for it to add new time intervals in the current round because more availability increase the 
upper bound of its preference violation cost. Therefore, it will follow the myopic strategy by 
reporting an empty bid. Let’s now consider the situation where the agent is not awarded in the 
previous round. Assume that the agent has reported first     time intervals in its FTI during 
the previous rounds. If the agent follows myopic strategy, it should add the  th time interval at 
the current round and update its availability to first   time intervals. To compare with the myopic 
strategy, we construct an alternative strategy, in which the agent reports first (   )  time 
intervals. In the following we first prove that the myopic strategy weakly dominates the 
alternative strategy. We consider three cases: 
Case#1: The agent is not awarded in the current round, no matter it submits first   or     time 
intervals. In this case, both first   and first     time intervals end up with the same 
preference violation cost which is   . There is no difference between the myopic and the 
alternative strategies. 
Case#2: The agent is awarded by submitting first   time intervals. In this case, the agent must be 
awarded by reporting first     time intervals because first   is a subset of first    . Since 
the awarded time bundle can fall into any one of the submitted time intervals, we compare the 
expected preference violation cost of the myopic strategy and the alternative strategy. Let    
denotes the number of available time intervals, each of which costs   . Since          
         , we know that     ∑   
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Since adding the time interval     will increase the feasible schedule space of the winner 
determination, therefore, will not change the value of   ,        , the left hand side of the 
last inequality can be interpreted as the expected cost of reporting first     intervals and the 
right hand side can be interpreted as the expected cost of reporting only first   intervals. It is 
clear that when the agent can be awarded by just reporting first   intervals. The myopic 
strategy always leads to less (or equal) expected preference violation cost than the alternative 
strategy does.  
Case#3: The agent is not awarded by reporting first   intervals, but awarded by reporting first 
    intervals. In this case, although by the myopic strategy, the agent is not awarded at the 
current round, it always has the option to report first     by repeatedly applying the myopic 
strategy in the next round. Given that the sequence of bidding does not affect the winner 
determination result, that is, the same set of availability intervals will result in the same 
provisional schedule, the agent will not lose any opportunity by adopting the myopic strategy.  
It follows that the myopic strategy weakly dominates the alternative strategy with first     
time intervals. This conclusion also applies to the initial round of bidding. Since the provisional 
schedule before the initial round is empty, which can be interpreted as no agent is allocated a 
bundle. Therefore the best strategy for agents’ initial round bidding is myopic strategy. That is, at 
the first round, an agent should bid with its lowest cost time intervals in its FTI. By mathematical 
induction, it follows that, myopic bidding is the dominant strategy for agents given the proposed 
iterative bidding mechanism    
4.5. Iterative Bidding with Partial Allocation during Each Round  
The iterative bidding procedure we have proposed computes provisional allocation during 
each round. It does not permanently award time bundles to customers until the termination 
condition is reached. The procedure may reach higher solution quality since it collects more 
agents’ availability along the process of bidding.  However, as the bidding proceeds, the size of 
the winner determination problem will increase continuously. Since we have proved that the 
winner determination problem is NP-hard, for a service scheduling problem with larger amount 




information is added. As a variant of the proposed iterative bidding procedure, we can actually 
award the provisional allocation to the customers during each round. In the subsequent round, 
those awarded time intervals will be removed from the service time inventory, the awarded 
customers will withdraw from the bidding process, and the customers who are not awarded in the 
current round will construct their bids based on the updated inventory. The service provider will 
solve the winner determination problem formulated by the updated inventory and the bids 
submitted in the current round.  In this case, the size of winner determination problem decreases 
along the iterations as both the number of provider’s inventory and the number of bidding agents 
decrease. The bidding terminates in lesser rounds than the original procedure does. In the next 
section, we will study the relationship between the efficiency of a solution and the privacy loss 
of customers under the iterative bidding procedures through a computational study. 
5. Privacy and Efficiency Analysis: A Computational Study 
By designing an iterative bidding framework, agents reveal their availability information as 
necessary. Also, higher system transparency makes the adoption of the framework easier. 
However, these benefits are obtained with a cost of efficiency. If at the termination of bidding all 
agents have revealed their full availability, the winner determination algorithm will compute an 
optimal schedule which maximizes the sum of the weights of awarded agents. However, when 
bidding terminates before all feasibility information becomes known to the auctioneer, the 
optimality of the solution is not guaranteed. In this section, we evaluate the privacy and 
efficiency performance of the proposed approach through a computational study. Given a 
solution schedule, the measure of its efficiency is defined as the ratio between its overall weight 
and that of an optimal solution for the same problem instance. The measure of privacy loss is the 
ratio of the revealed availability of all agents when the solution is reached and their complete 
availability. Intuitively, submitting more availability incurs high privacy loss, which increases 
the expected preference violation cost. We use ILOG CPLEX 12.1 (http://www-
01.ibm.com/software/integration/optimization/cplex-optimizer) as optimization engine for 
solving the winner determination model given the set of bids from agents as the input. The 
iterative bidding control logic is coded using the OPL Script language [19]. The control module 




01.ibm.com/software/integration/optimization/cplex-optimization-studio). All experiments were 
conducted on a PC with a 2.4 GHz CPU and 4 GB memory.  
 
Figure 2.   Efficiency increment during interative bidding  
            
 
Figure 3.   Privacy loss increment during iterative bidding 
                    
Figure 4.   Tradeoff between efficiency and privacy loss    
We generate a set of test problem instances by fixing the service provider’s time units 
inventory to 20 and the number of customers to 50. Customers’ weights are drawn from a 
uniform distribution in the range of 1 to 3. The processing times for agents’ requests are identical 






















































the service provider’s available time inventory to form its FTI. The sizes of agents’ FTIs are 
drawn from a uniform distribution in the range of 8 to 16 with a mean of 12.The length of the 
time intervals in FTIs is also restricted to one. The time intervals in FTIs are randomly ordered. 
We solve the set of problem instances using the proposed iterative bidding framework and 
compute the average efficiency and privacy loss at each round of bidding. The bidding processes 
without partial allocation usually terminate within 12 rounds which is the mean of the size of 
FTIs. The bidding processes with partial allocation usually terminate within 6 round, which are, 
as expected, much faster than the bidding without partial allocation case.  
Figures 3 and 4 show the efficiency and privacy loss increment during the bidding process.  
At round 6, the modified bidding procedure with partial allocation achieves on average 84% 
efficiency, whereas the original bidding procedure without partial allocation achieves on average 
93% efficiency at round 12.  The bidding procedure with partial allocation is essentially a greedy 
distributed search algorithm which can find a solution quickly. However, the solution quality can 
be compromised. The bidding procedure without partial allocation involves backtracking. It 
normally reaches higher quality solution, however, with more rounds of bidding. From Figure 4, 
we see that the privacy loss of bidding with partial allocation is always lower than that of bidding 
without partial allocation and the difference increases along the bidding process. Compared with 
bidding without partial allocation, it seems that bidding with partial allocation can find a 
reasonably good solution with much less computation costs and privacy loss. Figure 5 shows the 
tradeoff between efficiency and privacy loss. We see that high efficiency demands more privacy, 
which is natural. It is observed that increasing privacy loss has a diminishing return in efficiency. 
Bidding with partial allocation can reach 84% efficiency with only 34% privacy loss, whereas 
bidding without partial allocation needs to double the privacy loss (70%) in order to reach the 
same efficiency level. For bidding without partial allocation, a solution with 93% efficiency 
demands 79% privacy loss. Since agents decide when to stop submitting more availability 
information to the auctioneer, the bidding procedure actually provides agents with the option of 
setting their respective privacy loss limits based on their own calculation of the costs caused by 
privacy loss. In this experiment, we did not consider the situation where agents have privacy loss 
limits. However, Figure 5 gives an indication regarding the efficiency we can reach given 
various levels’ loss of privacy.  







Num. of available time 
units for bidding 
Run time 
(seconds) 
1 100 20 0.36 
2 200 20 0.42 
3 300 20 0.68 
4 300 40 1.08 
5 400 20 1.52 
6 500 40 2.16 
7 800 40 2.67 
8 1000 40 3.48 
The responsiveness and scalability of the proposed bidding framework are mainly determined 
by the computation time needed to solve the winner determination problem at each round of 
bidding (we assume that the computation needed for an agent to order its time intervals in FTI is 
trivial). To evaluate the effectiveness of using ILOG CPLEX 12.1 for solving the winner 
determination problems, we have randomly generated eight groups of problem instances with 
different sizes and structures. Weights of agents and sizes of FTIs are drawn from the same 
distributions as previously generated problem sets. The configuration of the test problem sets and 
the corresponding solving time by CPLEX 12.1 are summarized in Table 1.  Based on the run 
time results, it is clear that the proposed iterative bidding framework can be practically applied to 
large scale NCSS problems. For example, CPLEX 12.1 can solve a winner determination 
problem with 40 available time units and 1000 agents in 3.48 seconds. In this case, if the mean of 
the size of agents’ FTIs is 12, which is quite reasonable in many application domains, the overall 
bidding procedure will likely to terminate within 45 seconds. This level of responsiveness is 
sufficient for most of the NCSS applications. 
6. Related work 
There has been growing research efforts on services supply chains. Many of them extrapolate 
lessons learned in the manufacturing sector to the service sector [20]. For decentralized 
scheduling problems, economic based mechanisms have been proposed to facilitate information 
sharing and achieving high efficiency given the self-interested nature of participants [21].  These 
approaches usually model processing times of resources as goods to be sold in the market, e.g. 
landing timeslots of airport runways [22], machine processing times of a factory [11], 
computation and network accessing times of internet resources [23], and the right to use railroad 




Different types of auctions have been proposed for decentralized scheduling in the literature.  
While giving a comprehensive review of these models is beyond the scope of this paper, we 
summarize three typical auctions which are of importance to decentralized scheduling. The core 
issue here is how to accommodate the complementarity of agents’ preferences over bundles of 
time units. 
Sequential and simultaneous auctions price bundles as the sum price of the individual items. 
They do not allow bidders to bid on bundles. Sequential auctions suppose that the set of items are 
auctioned in sequence. Bidders bid for items in a specific, known order, and can choose how 
much (and whether) to bid for an item depending on past successes, failures, prices, and so on. 
Sequential auctions are particularly useful in situations where setting up combinatorial or 
simultaneous auctions are infeasible. Simultaneous auctions sell multiple items in separate 
markets simultaneously. Bidders have to interact with simultaneous but distinct markets in order 
to obtain a combination of items sufficient to accomplish their task. Real-world markets quite 
typically operate separately and concurrently despite significant interactions in preferences. A 
typical example is the series of FCC spectrum auctions [25]. In [24], simultaneous auctions are 
designed for decentralized train scheduling problems. A review of the uses of economic theory in 
simultaneous auction design can be found in [26]. Sequential and simultaneous auctions fail 
when there are no prices that support an efficient solution (the existence problem) and also when 
agents bid cautiously to avoid purchasing an incomplete bundle (the exposure problem). 
However, given that these auctions are more practical in terms of computation, they are two 
important models worthy of further study.  
Combinatorial auctions (CAs) allow bidders to place bids on bundles of items. It addresses 
complementary preference issue explicitly. However, the computation required for solving hard 
valuation problems and winner determination problems can be prohibitive. In general, CAs are 
likely to be practical for smaller size problems. The computational complexities of CAs have 
been studied by various researchers [18]. Some sophisticated algorithms have produced 
promising results [27].  
Iterative bundle auctions are iterative implementations of CAs. This class of auction has 
practical significance because it addresses the computational and informational complexities of 
CAs by allowing bidders to reveal their preference information only as necessary as the auction 




about their private valuations. With careful design of the structure and components, iterative 
bundle auctions have the potential of significantly reducing computational costs in CAs. In 
addition, iterative auctions specially designed for scheduling problems have also been proposed 
in the literature. In [28], iterative auctions are applied to the job shop scheduling problem. The 
focus in [28] is to investigate the links between combinatorial auctions and Lagrangean 
relaxation, and to design auctions based on the Lagrangean based decomposition. In [11], the 
properties of several iterative auction protocols are investigated in the context of decentralized 
scheduling. In [29] and [30] price prediction and bidding strategies for simultaneous auctions are 
studied in the setting of market-based scheduling. The proposed framework in this paper is an 
iterative bundle auction specially designed for scheduling problems. In many cases, iterative 
auctions present better computational and privacy properties than those of CAs. In addition, 
iterative auctions have the potential of accommodating dynamic events, which is required in 
many real-world scheduling applications. The sequential, simultaneous, combinatorial and 
iterative bundle auctions are important models for accommodating complementary preferences 
of agents. However, they require price or payment mechanisms, therefore cannot be directly 
applied to our NCSS setting.  
Secure multiparty computation (SMC) protocols enable a group of mutually distrustful parties 
to perform a joint computation with private inputs. In theory, trading partners could benefit from 
strong privacy protection by using SMC protocols in supply chain collaboration. However, the 
uptake of SMC in practical applications is still rare [31]. There could be three lines of 
explanations. Catrina and Kerschbaum argue that this is due to poor performance, functionality, 
and scalability, as well as architectures that do not meet the needs of the applications. At a more 
general level, Goldreich states in [32] that although the general secure multi-party computation 
problem is solvable in theory, using the solutions derived by these general results for special 
cases can be impractical. In other words, efficiency dictates that development of special solutions 
for special cases for efficiency reasons. In addition, secure multi-party protocols are a form of 
cooperative distributed computing. They preserve the privacy of the participants’ data. However, 
they assume cooperative behavior of participants. In other words, participants are willing to 
supply true and complete information to the secure protocol. Game theoretic behavior of 
participants is not explicitly modeled in SMC, which restricts its application to supply chain 




auctions are proposed in [7]. These protocols allow buyers to reveal only partial information of 
their price-quantity pair bids to the supplier. However, incentives are still needed to motivate 
buyers from hiding or misreporting their true private information. In our services scheduling 
model, customers can behave strategically by hiding availability information. Furthermore, 
SMCs usually do not assume any trusted center, which is not the case in our services scheduling 
setting.  
7. Conclusion 
In recent years, the economy has evolved from manufacturing to services. Service supply chain 
management has become an important research area with significant practical implications. 
Scheduling non-commercial services for self-interested customers who behave strategically to 
protect their privacy is a challenging problem attributed to the different objectives of service 
provider and the customers. In non-commercial services scheduling environments, no payment 
transfers are allowed, which eliminates the possibility of designing price or payment based 
mechanisms to balance the supply and demand.  We propose a bidding framework for scheduling 
non-commercial services and evaluate its efficiency and privacy performance through theoretical 
analysis and computational experiments. We show that, under the proposed auction mechanism, 
myopic bidding is the dominant strategy for customers. In terms of the efficiency and privacy 
performance, the computational study shows that bidding with partial allocation can find a 
reasonably good solution with much less computation costs and privacy loss. For both cases of 
bidding with and without partial allocation, increasing privacy loss has a diminishing return in 
efficiency. Experimental results also show that the proposed framework scales well to large size 
problems. 
 For future research, we will study the applicability of the proposed bidding framework to 
various types of services scheduling domains. We plan to build an integrated simulation 
environment with interactive user interfaces for both customers and the service provider. We 
believe that such a simulation environment can provides more insights in terms of the role that 
privacy plays in service scheduling.  
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